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Spycatcher’s Little Sister: The Thatcher government and the Panorama affair, 
1980-81
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Abstract: This article investigates the Thatcher government’s attempts to suppress or 
censor BBC reporting on secret intelligence issues in the early 1980s. It examines 
official reactions to a BBC intrusion into the secret world, as the team behind the long-
running Panorama documentary strand sought to examine the role and accountability of 
Britain’s clandestine services. It also assesses the nature and extent of any collusion 
between the government and the BBC’s senior management and contributes to the 
ongoing evaluation of how the Thatcher government’s approaches to press freedom, 
national security, and secrecy evolved. It is also argued that the Panorama affair was an 
important waypoint on the journey towards the dramatic Spycatcher episode of the mid-
1980s, when Margaret Thatcher’s efforts to suppress embittered former MI5 officer 
Peter Wright’s memoir resulted in huge public embarrassment. The key players on the 
government side – Thatcher and Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong – failed to learn 
the lessons of the 1980-81 affair, that it was often more dangerous to attempt 
suppression than to simply let events run their course. 
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At the end of May 1980, John Gau – the BBC’s head of current affairs programmes – 
wrote from Lime Grove studios to a veritable ‘who’s who’ of Britain’s post-war 
intelligence community. He enquired if they were interested in providing information or 
interviews for a Panorama programme investigating 'competence, public accountability, 
terms of reference, finance' and other issues relating to Britain’s clandestine agencies, 
agencies that officially did not even exist. Gau noted that recent events such as art 
historian Anthony Blunt’s exposure as a Soviet mole, investigative journalist Duncan 
Campbell’s reportage, and Labour MP Robin Cook’s security services bill had made 
this a matter of legitimate public interest.
2
 These letters sparked a nine-month battle 
between Margaret Thatcher’s government and Britain’s public broadcaster, and between 
the BBC’s Director General (DG) and his subordinates, the trades unions, and the print 
media. Battle lines were rapidly drawn over official recognition of secret services 
activities and their accountability to parliament and the public. An integral part of this 
affair involved the BBC’s ability to report on national security issues, and the increasing 
tension between the state, the print media, and the televisual cornerstone of Britain’s 
cultural life. 
This article investigates the under-analysed attempts by Thatcher and her 
government to suppress or censor BBC reporting on secret intelligence issues in the 
early 1980s. The official file maintained by the Prime Minister’s office on the affair was 
released into the UK’s National Archives in 2011, declassification provoking a brief 
																																																						
2
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flurry of media coverage, commentators focusing on the then DG Sir Ian Trethowan’s 
role as a conduit between the government and the BBC.
3
 This study goes goes beyond 
the 2011 release, using newly available records from the BBC’s Written Archives 
Centre and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), permitting a deeper analysis of 
events.
4
  
 Specifically, this article reveals the nature of official reactions to a BBC 
intrusion into the secret world, as the team behind the long-running Panorama strand 
sought to examine the role and accountability of Britain’s clandestine services. It 
assesses the nature and extent of any collusion between the government and the BBC’s 
senior management. It also contributes to the ongoing evaluation of how the Thatcher 
government’s approaches to press freedom, national security, and secrecy evolved. 
Furthermore, this article argues that the Panorama affair was an important waypoint on 
the journey towards the dramatic Spycatcher episode of the mid-1980s, when Margaret 
Thatcher’s efforts to suppress embittered former MI5 officer Peter Wright’s memoir 
resulted in huge public embarrassment. The key players on the government side – 
Thatcher and Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong – had failed to learn the lessons of 
the 1980-81 affair, that it was often more dangerous to attempt suppression than to 
simply let events run their course. 
																																																						
3
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(accessed 25 November 2015); ‘Secret service pressed BBC to censor Panorama – papers’, 30 December 
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of certain face to face discussions. Furthermore, many of the departments involved disavow the existence 
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The contemporary and historical aspects of the relationship between 
governments, intelligence agencies, and the media have received increased scholarly 
attention in recent years.
5
 In the BBC’s case, historians demonstrate that the Cold War 
saw a complex and contested dynamic develop between broadcaster, government, and 
the intelligence services. From the end of World War Two onwards, the corporation had 
the difficult job of balancing objectivity and journalistic impartiality with the dictates of 
anti-communism and deference to the secret state.
6
 More often than not, the latter won 
out. 
The BBC’s DG was often a key figure in this dynamic. Officially the 
corporation’s chief executive and editorial head, by its nature the position requires 
frequent contact with officialdom on controversial issues. The record of successive DGs 
in resisting or acquiescing to official pressure on sensitive matters is complex. Post-war 
holders of the post had frequently held sensitive positions or been privy to official 
secrets. General Sir Ian Jacob (DG, 1952-59) had been an assistant to Winston 
Churchill’s war cabinet and a staunch supporter of the Foreign Office’s clandestine anti-
communist propaganda unit the Information Research Department (IRD).
7
 Jacob’s 
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successor, Hugh Carleton-Green (DG, 1960-69), had been behind the British 
psychological warfare effort against Malayan communist insurgents in 1950-51, and 
while DG, was party to the suppression of Peter Watkins’s controversial pseudo-
documentary The War Game in 1965.
8
 Ian Trethowan himself was a close friend of 
Edward Heath (Conservative Prime Minister from 1970 to 1974) and at times was 
believed by his subordinates to be a little to close to the secret services.
9
 In showing 
deference to official authority during the Panorama affair, Trethowan thus did little to 
break an established pattern. 
The 1980-81 Panorama affair has received little to no coverage in the literature. 
Historian Jean Seaton’s controversial analysis of the BBC from 1974 to 1987 does not 
mention it, while journalists Richard Lyndley and Michael Leapman offer only a few 
brief paragraphs within their books on – respectively – Panorama and the BBC.
10
 Ian 
Trethowan reflected on the affair in his 1984 memoir and in his reminiscences, former 
Panorama editor Roger Bolton comments on the imbroglio.
11
 Little has therefore been 
said about the affair, bracketed as it was by other more prominent conflicts between the 
BBC and the Thatcher government, such as Tonight’s interview with the Irish National 
Liberation Army on the assassination of Thatcher confidante Airey Neave, the 
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‘Carrickmore affair’, and accusations of ‘unpatriotic’ coverage during the Falklands 
conflict. 
  
The affair emerged into a heightened atmosphere surrounding Britain’s relationship 
with its secret intelligence and security services. Periodic ‘intelligence flaps’ had been 
part of the scene for decades and the post-war era saw concerns about intelligence 
capabilities, spies, subversion, and the relationship between the media and national 
security regularly rear their heads. The affair also emerged into a renewed Cold War, 
with the decline of détente and the resurgence of East-West hostility, where intelligence 
remained the Cold War’s front line.
12
 
During the 1950s and 60s, Daily Express journalist Chapman Pincher was a 
persistent thorn in the secret world’s side, as well as a useful conduit for official 
leaking. Prime Minister Harold MacMillan asked, ‘Can nothing be done to supress or 
get rid of Mr Chapman Pincher?’ while the historian E. P. Thompson pungently 
described the journalist as ‘a kind of official urinal’.
 13
 By 1967, ministers were mired in 
the ‘D Notice Affair’, the furore centring around Pincher’s revelation that the 
intelligence services were intercepting private telegrams, and Harold Wilson’s clumsy, 
counter-productive attempts to reinforce the secret state’s crumbling walls.
14
 The D-
notice system – which persists today – was a voluntary system of regulation that 
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 Moran, Classified, 129, see 95-135 for an examination of Pincher’s career. ‘Chapman Pincher - 
obituary’, The Telegraph, 6 August 2014 
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October 23, 2016) 
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 See Moran, Classified, 136-176 for a dissection of the affair. 
	 8	
brought together the press and the government. Reporting on matters related to nuclear 
weapons and the activities of intelligence agencies were two areas where journalists 
were limited in what they could report. As the decades progressed, the system came 
under increasing pressure and began to fray around the edges.
15
 Wilson’s government 
also intervened to ensure the suppression of Peter Watkins’ landmark 1965 nuclear 
conflict drama The War Game, for fear of it weakening public support for nuclear 
deterrence. This was a moment when – as with Panorama fifteen years later – the BBC 
approached the limits of what the government felt was appropriate for Cold War public 
consumption.
16
 
Parallel to Britain’s economic woes in the 1970s, the edifice of the secret state 
suffered similar troubles. The activities of intelligence community apostate Phillip Agee 
and journalist Mark Hosenball (both Americans residing in the UK) in publicising 
details of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel raised the secret world’s 
profile and resulted in their deportation.
17
 In 1976, the young journalist Duncan 
Campbell exposed the existence, purpose, and location of the most secret of secret 
services: Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
18
 By 1978, Campbell 
and his co-defendants Crispin Aubrey and John Berry found themselves in court for 
probing British signals intelligence. As Richard Aldrich argues, the ‘ABC Trial’ was a 
																																																						
15
 See Nicholas J. Wilkinson, Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the United Kingdom's D-
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Journal of Contemporary History (hereafter JCH), 41:1 (Jan., 
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‘landmark event’ that simply focused more attention on GCHQ’s activities. The three 
were cleared of all but the most minor charges, as much to the Callaghan government’s 
embarrassment it was revealed that the vast majority of their information came from 
publicly available sources.
19
 This was only the beginning for Campbell, who by the 
1980s had become the secret state’s pre-eminent journalistic opponent. 
 Campbell loomed large in government thinking on the Panorama affair, his 
work influencing and complicating matters. Writing for the left-leaning New Statesman, 
in the first half of 1980 Campbell penned articles that delved into every aspect of 
modern Britain’s relationship with its security and intelligence services, examining 
telephone tapping and communications interception, the service’s accountability, and 
press freedom to report on ‘national security’ issues.
20
 Unlike the staunchly 
Conservative Pincher – who cultivated relationships with the rich, powerful, and well-
connected through fine dining and weekend grouse-shoots – Campbell’s genius lay in 
his ability to scour public sources, listen to the disaffected, and make connections where 
others saw none.
21
  
 Changing attitudes towards secrecy were not only the province of journalists and 
intelligence apostates. In December 1979, Labour MP Robin Cook drew attention to the 
																																																						
19
 Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The uncensored story of Britain’s most secret intelligence agency (London, 
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20
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21
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secret services through a bill in the House of Commons that – in the wake of Blunt’s 
exposure by Margaret Thatcher – rather sarcastically suggested giving ‘legal authority 
for the creation of a security service, and to provide for the appointment of its Director 
General and for his accountability to Parliament’. Of greatest concern to the young MP 
were the legal status and parliamentary accountability of any such service.
22
 The 
government’s approach was to give as little credence to the bill as possible, and 
Thatcher reluctantly assented to a ‘do nothing’ approach, letting the bill – which had 
little chance of progressing – fade away with minimal fuss.
23
 
Thatcher herself had a confrontational and complex relationship with 
broadcasters in general, and the BBC in particular. She viewed the Corporation as anti-
commercial and self-righteous, poisoning the national debate with its brand of wooly 
liberalism and moral permissiveness. Thatcher judged domestic reporting – especially 
on national security issues – within a Cold War paradigm, as a ‘weapon in the global 
battle of ideas’.
24
 She had little time for the notion that BBC journalists could be 
skeptics. For her, they were simply subversives at a time when Britain was fighting the 
Cold War and terrorism.
25
 Thus, a culture of ‘reflexive secrecy’ surrounded those 
clandestine services that were playing such a critical role in the wars against the Soviet 
Union and Irish republicanism.
26
 
																																																						
22
 Robin Cook MP, House of Commons Debate, ‘Security Service’, 11 December 1979, Hansard Online, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1979/dec/11/security-service (accessed 29 November 
2015). 
23
 ‘Note for the Record’, 10 December 1979, The National Archives of the UK (hereafter TNA), Records 
of the Prime Minister’s Office (hereafter PREM) 19/119. 
24
 John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, Volume 2: The Iron Lady (London, 2003), 401-02. 
25
 Ibid, 403. 
26
 Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust, 171. 
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Thatcher’s beliefs strongly influenced the Panorama affair. The Prime Minister 
loved intelligence and sympathized with the challenges faced by secret service 
personnel.
27
 Her suspicion that any programme about the intelligence services would be 
partisan and damaging to the effectiveness and morale of the community came up 
against journalists with a belief in the right, and need, to know. Thatcher also believed 
in ‘patriotic censorship’. Harking back to the World War 2 practices, the idea’s 
influence in opposition to the media’s increasing tendency to push the limits of dissent 
is plain to see.
28
 For the Conservative leadership, 1939-45 was the touchstone for great 
British struggles, defiance, and victory.
29
 Likewise, the secret services importance in 
combating the imminent threat to Britain’s national security and national integrity 
represented by the Northern Ireland situation was another complicating factor that 
militated against official openness on the workings and accountability of the security 
and intelligence agencies.
30
 
Popular culture also tapped into the zeitgeist. Alongside relatively lightweight 
fare such as ITV’s The Professionals, The Sandbaggers, and the James Bond movie 
Moonraker, the BBC’s landmark adaptation of John Le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, 
Spy aired from September to October 1979. The muted, realistic world of George 
Smiley – at odds with Bond’s jet-set glamour – dramatised for the British viewers the 
																																																						
27
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28
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crumbling world of the secret state and almost instantly achieved the status of modern 
television classic.
31
 
In this atmosphere, the Panorama team set out to explore the workings, actions, 
and accountability of Britain’s intelligence services. The ‘shock troops of truth’ at Lime 
Grove were late to the party, but sought to deploy the BBC’s weight and reputation to 
produce an authoritative, impartial programme drawing together the threads spun by 
Agee, Campbell, Cook, Hosenball, and Pincher. This was viewed with deep suspicion 
by a government that sought to bolster the secret state against its attackers, real and 
imagined. 
 
In mid-June 1980, Panorama’s editor Roger Bolton outlined to his superiors the reasons 
why his team were making a programme on the secret services.
32
 Bolton said that 
journalist Tom Mangold and producer John Penycate would examine ‘how the services 
can serve the country effectively while maintaining democratic accountability’ by 
‘bringing together already published material and making it comprehensible’.
33
 He 
argued that Blunt, Cook’s bill, reviews of the D Notice system, Lord Diplock’s ongoing 
inquiry into telephone tapping, and disclosures made by The New Statesman and 
Panorama’s great rival ITV’s World in Action, made the matter one of legitimate public 
																																																						
31
 Joseph Oldham, ‘“Disappointed romantics”: Troubled Heritage in the BBC’s John le Carré 
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32
 Bolton had enraged Thatcher as editor on programmes about Northern Ireland. See Gary Edgerton, 
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33
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interest.
34
 Bolton had also witnessed the Church Committee’s impact in the United 
States, which raised serious questions of intelligence agency accountability.
35
 The 
programme, Bolton stated, was not ‘motivated by any great scandal’ and Mangold later 
recalled that ‘politics did not enter my reasoning’.
36
 
By this early stage, however, the government was moving against the project. 
Rather than replying, the recipients of Gau’s May missives had passed the letters to 
Whitehall. Thatcher was alerted to the issue during an early June meeting on the official 
histories of Britain’s secret services (a project that Thatcher tried to quash).
37
 In the 
interim, there had already been informal, ‘high level’ contact with the BBC about the 
production. At this point, Armstrong refrained from overt criticism, and suggested that 
in all likelihood, the programme would never be transmitted.
38
 
These ‘informal contacts’ were between Ian Trethowan and Bernard Sheldon, 
who for nearly two decades was legal adviser to MI5.
39
 Thus began the rather 
conservative Trethowan’s clandestine role as a conduit for government and intelligence 
community wishes. It was the first of a series of breaches of the BBC’s supposed 
editorial independence. The DG was – initially – guardedly positive, remarking that 
																																																						
34
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banned by the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) for being ‘prejudicial to national security’. The 
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37
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38
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accountability was a matter of legitimate public interest. Regardless, Trethowan raised 
issues that would prove to be a constant in the Panorama affair: that the secret services’ 
work should remain secret; that the ongoing public comment about those services 
stemmed from ‘the far left’; and that behind everything lurked the Machiavellian figure 
of Duncan Campbell. Trethowan confessed to disliking Campbell, the journalist having 
recently written an ‘absurd piece’ about the BBC Monitoring Service’s activities.
40
 
 Notwithstanding these opinions, the Panorama team assumed that the 
programme would be transmitted. Mangold contacted Nicholas Fenn, the FCO News 
Department’s chief. Mangold described his letter as ‘one for the Department of Long 
Shots’ but reminded Fenn that he had usefully assisted a September 1979 Panorama 
episode on the Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security (KGB). The journalist then 
asked if he could obtain an interview with Soviet defector Captain Vladimir Rezun, and 
if the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, more commonly known as MI6) could give a 
non-attributable briefing?
41
 When Fenn called Mangold, the BBC man accepted that 
meeting with Rezun would be impossible, but expressed incredulity that SIS would not 
wish to offer a briefing. According to Fenn, Mangold stated that he would not be 
dissuaded by an absence of official cooperation, a decision that might lead to serious 
distortions and give ‘disproportionate space to partisan lobbies’. Fenn noted Mangold’s 
intention to invite Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington for interview, with Fenn 
																																																						
40
 Trethowan to Gau, Memo, 18 July 1980, WAC, T62/285/1; Trethowan, Split Screen, 189-190. BBC 
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41
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suggesting (reading between the lines of Mangold’s comments) that any refusal would 
lead to Britain’s most senior diplomat being publicly pilloried.
42
 
The decision not to permit the Rezun interview or an SIS briefing came from a 
much higher level than Fenn. Indeed, the FCO press officer argued that the choice was a 
mistake, and hoped it would be reviewed.
43
 The higher level was represented by Sir 
Anthony Acland, Deputy Under-secretary at the FCO, and the chair of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC).
44
 Matters did not stop with Acland. Pressure was already 
being exerted on the BBC and the issue would shortly be debated at the highest levels of 
government. 
Accountability sat at the heart of Bolton, Mangold and Penycate’s desire to 
make the programme, and the official resistance to it. This resistance was going against 
the flow of events. In the United States, the Senate had just passed the brief but forceful 
Intelligence Oversight Act (IOA), which mandated that America’s secret services make 
their covert activities accountable to Congress.
45
 The CIA – in an attempt to repair their 
post-Church image – orchestrated a campaign of media openness during the Carter 
years.
46
 The revelations in the United States had worried Britain’s intelligence 
community, provoking concern that they too would be subject to similar analysis. 
Despite the changes taking place in the US, there was no British equivalent to the IOA, 
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Church Committee, or 1976 Government in the Sunshine Act.
47
 Even on a less 
glamourous issue such as data protection, Thatcher’s government resisted statutory 
oversight.
48
 
 
After the initial skirmish, Panorama became a subject of concern for the Conservative 
administration’s upper echelons. The main figures on the government side were 
Thatcher and Armstrong, the latter a key link with the BBC and the architect of 
government policy on the matter. A more shadowy presence was Bernard Sheldon, the 
secret world’s legal brain. Sheldon was undoubtedly the main instrument of censorship, 
but the nature of his ‘recommendations’ must be deduced from Trethowan’s subsequent 
changes to the programme.  
 On 21 July, Armstrong noted that he and Sheldon had once more met with 
Trethowan, whose gloomy view was that he did not think he could prevent a 
programme on accountability, even though he understood ‘the dangers of lending 
respectability’ to a campaign by Campbell, Cook, Robert Cryer, and others, all of whom 
were on the political left.
49
 Thatcher emphatically objected to a programme on 
accountability, against Armstrong’s suggestion that this was an issue of legitimate 
interest. Campbell and his writings were a thread running through government concerns 
about the programme. The journalist was seen as provoking the BBC’s interest, 
although Armstrong was uncertain if Campbell bore any direct responsibility. Anxiety 
was expressed about the effects on the ‘morale and effectiveness of the intelligence 
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services’ should media coverage go beyond minority interest publications like The New 
Statesman.
50
 Here were two of the affair’s critical features: the BBC’s reformulation 
and publicisation of existing issues for a far wider audience than The New Statesman’s 
readership and the perceived effect publicity would have the secret services ability to do 
their Cold War job. 
An official veto was Armstrong’s most dramatic proposed response. Through 
the BBC charter, the Home Secretary possessed the authority to restrict broadcasting on 
certain issues. A more innocent use of this was to limit political broadcasting during an 
election, but it had never been used to suppress a particular programme. Armstrong 
contended the veto’s use would ‘produce a tremendous hoo-ha, inside the BBC, in the 
Press and in Parliament, about censorship.’ For the Government and the BBC alike, the 
veto had ‘many of the qualities of a nuclear deterrent.’
51
 Informed by her belief in the 
Cold War as an actual war, and reinforced by the conflict in Northern Ireland, Thatcher 
noted ‘I would be prepared to use the veto.’
52
 Thus, if the BBC were unwilling to self-
censor for the good of the nation in a time of supposed national crisis, Thatcher would 
do it for them. 
 A basic plan was hammered out by Thatcher, Armstrong, Willie Whitelaw, and 
Peter Carrington. Secret service chiefs had presciently informed Armstrong that using 
the veto would probably be a bad idea, the resulting row likely to do more damage than 
the programme. Reason, the intelligence community suggested, must be used to 
persuade the BBC to drop the issue and desist from examining the service’s workings.
53
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A tripartite approach was agreed. Firstly, Armstrong would attempt to persuade 
Trethowan to drop the programme. Sir Brian Cubbon – Permanent Under Secretary at 
the Home Office – would raise the issue informally with George Howard, the new 
Chairman of the BBC’s Board of Governors. And it was decided that if both approaches 
failed, Thatcher, Armstrong, Carrington, and Whitelaw would meet again to take a 
decision on the nuclear option.
54
 
 A few days later, Armstrong met Trethowan again, once more connecting the 
BBC with the activities of secrecy’s left-wing opponents, arguing that ‘the activities of 
Duncan Campbell and those associated with him were doing the effectiveness of the 
intelligence services no good’, indirectly contending that the BBC’s activities were 
unpatriotic within the context of a renewed Cold War. Yet, aware of The New 
Statesman’s small circulation, he contended that Panorama’s exploration of the 
accountability and workings of Britain’s secret services would be far more dangerous.
55
 
Trethowan responded that the BBC would not make anything that was not ‘authoritative 
and balanced’ and that because of the services’ unwillingness to cooperate, such a 
production would be near impossible. Armstrong noted that the Panorama team had 
been casting their net internationally, activities that the government found ‘not merely 
disagreeable but in some cases positively discreditable’. Referring to an ongoing dispute 
over BBC funding, Armstrong found Trethowan’s statement that cost would not prevent 
the production being dropped rather cavalier.
56
 Concluding, Armstrong queried if the 
BBC wished to be associated with Cook, Campbell, and their campaign to ‘discredit’ 
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the services and damage their effectiveness, something they may be exploiting the 
Corporation to do? Trethowan promised to consider this.
57
 Reading the record of the 
conversation, Thatcher noted ‘the matter has been put to the BBC in no uncertain 
terms.’
58
 
 Trethowan’s reflections did not endear him to Thatcher and illustrated the 
problematic nature of his position regarding attempts to influence the work done by a 
supposedly impartial, apolitical public broadcaster. On Trethowan’s inability to stop the 
production, Thatcher stated he was ‘being as weak as I expected. I hope George Howard 
will insist on seeing the programme’.
59
 Thatcher’s faith in Howard was misplaced. 
Despite being a staunch Tory and Whitelaw’s close friend, he was a louche, anti-
establishment figure, a ‘resolute defender of the BBC’ at odds with Thatcher’s opinion 
that the Chairman and his Board were there to keep the BBC in line.
60
 What was it that 
raised Thatcher’s ire? Yet again, the secret world’s left-wing bete noir had been 
invoked, this time by Trethowan who was ‘acutely conscious’ of the need to avoid 
being exploited by Duncan Campbell. Yet, Trethowan typified the tension between 
national security and the right to know when he remarked that public interest demanded 
the BBC address these topical issues. Consequently, the DG had allowed his 
subordinates to continue to pursue their investigations regarding foreign agencies and 
intelligence service accountability. Bolton, Mangold, and Penycate were not, however, 
to attempt to get material from present or former members of the British services, a 
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diktat they largely ignored. This attempted balancing of journalistic integrity with the 
secret state’s needs was doubtless where Thatcher perceived ‘weakness’. 
Armstrong contended that the government had now gone as far as it could, the 
only further resort being the veto, an option that could cause an unholy political and 
public row about censorship.
61
 The FCO’s Permanent Under Secretary’s Department 
(responsible for the JIC) agreed, noting that ‘the fuss about censorship which [using the 
veto] would almost certainly outweigh any damage to the intelligence services which 
would arise from allowing a programme…to be screened.’
62
 
 Given that Campbell lurked in the government’s psyche like a recurring 
nightmare, it is worth considering his role in the affair. The Panorama team had met 
with the journalist, on 2 June. As Penycate noted, this was because the BBC were 
moving into areas of interest that overlapped with Campbell’s. Penycate hoped 
Campbell might be able to steer Panorama towards useful topics or individuals, whilst 
retaining his right to source anonymity and that he would be appropriately recompensed 
and credited.
63
 However, the relationship became sour and acrimonious. There had been 
two meetings between Campbell, The New Statesman’s editor Bruce Page, Penycate, 
and Mangold, but by 1981 Penycate alleged that the print journalist had made 
‘threatening and hectoring’ telephone calls to him. The producer had reneged on his 
commitment to give Campbell on-screen credit and a squabble developed over 
payment.
64
 By the February’s end, Mangold wrote to Page, complaining about 
supposedly falsely attributed remarks and anecdotes that appeared in a Campbell article 
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about the Panorama debacle. The BBC man contended that the relationship collapsed 
because of Campbell’s ‘splenetic petulance’ and noted to his boss Alan Protheroe 
(Assistant Director of News and Current Affairs) that the Corporation should disengage 
from any kind of relationship with Campbell.
65
 
 
By autumn 1980, attitudes within the Thatcher government hardened, putting 
Trethowan under even greater pressure. Not only did the DG find himself in off-the-
record meetings with senior secret service officers, he also had to deal with Margaret 
Thatcher’s displeasure. The Prime Minister grew increasingly angry about the BBC’s 
alleged prejudice, supposed efforts to discredit the security services, and perceived 
unwillingness to censor themselves in the national interest.  
 Official demands on Trethowan were relentless. He found himself privately 
briefed by MI6’s DG Arthur Franks, MI5’s chief Sir Howard Smith, and Bernard 
Sheldon. Trethowan also assured George Howard that the programme would remain 
within the D Notice system.
66
 Armstrong felt that the BBC was displaying ‘prejudice 
against the services’ when it was discovered that Panorama was investigating 
whistleblower John ‘Jock’ Kane’s allegations of fraud and lax security at GCHQ’s 
Hong Kong outpost (allegations that first surfaced in The New Statesman and had then 
been the subject of the May 1980 World in Action documentary that had been censored 
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by the IBA). Armstrong commented that just because material had appeared in print, it 
did not mean the BBC should feel free to air whatever it liked. ‘This’, he noted ‘was D 
Notice country’. Regardless, the Cabinet Secretary quashed Trethowan’s suggestion that 
the D Notice Committee’s Secretary view a rough cut of the film, believing that leaks 
and outrage would be the likely consequence.
67
 It is clear that where the BBC was 
concerned, press freedom was not absolute. While print journalists such as Campbell 
could publish material about the secret state (albeit, with considerable official 
annoyance), the publicly funded BBC occupied a different space. For officialdom, the 
corporation’s cachet, their global reach, and their central position in post-war Britain’s 
cultural life meant that greater rigour and responsibility was expected of them. The veto 
resurfaced as the government reassessed its approach. Armstrong was anxious about the 
programme’s potential to ‘diminish the morale’ of the intelligence services and reduce 
their ‘capacity to do their job effectively’. If threatening a D Notice breach was not 
enough, the veto might be required.
68
 Such was the situation’s seriousness that Thatcher 
called another meeting of senior ministers.
69
 
 Into October, Thatcher made it clear that she ‘feared that the purpose of those 
who were making the programme was to discredit’ the intelligence services, services 
that she cherished. Given that the programme was contrary to her perception of the 
national interest and what the ‘British’ part of ‘BBC’ actually meant, the Prime Minister 
reiterated her willingness to deploy the ultimate deterrent of the veto. Supporting 
Thatcher, Carrington agreed the veto could potentially be used, but suspected that the 
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BBC would go ahead and leak the programme anyway. Whitelaw – having conversed 
with his friend George Howard – felt that the veto would be counterproductive.
70
 
Thatcher viewed a potential informal briefing of the Panorama team by senior 
intelligence figures with suspicion. While she was happy for Sheldon to brief Mangold, 
she balked at the involvement of senior worthies such as former MI5 and MI6 DG Dick 
White.
71
 Anthony Acland responded in even stronger terms, contending that any 
briefing for Mangold – even by Sheldon – should be avoided.
72
 Former Home Secretary 
Lord Robert Carr’s involvement in the programme was also quashed. Carr was unhappy 
about being asked, but felt he could balance the views of former Labour Home 
Secretary and Northern Ireland Secretary Merlyn Rees, who was known to be appearing 
in the film (a point that Acland agreed with).
73
 However, Thatcher’s objections to Carr’s 
participation ended the matter, much to the Conservative peer’s relief.
74
 
 After this flurry of discussion, there followed a quiet period, save for a 
controversial meeting between Trethowan and Mangold. There is no documentary 
record of this consultation, other than Mangold’s recollections in a 2011 BBC radio 
interview and a 2014 Daily Mail article, and a brief internal memo from the DG. 
According to Mangold, Trethowan was effusively flattering, but then produced the 
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programme’s script and announced that he would be passing it to the people ‘at Curzon 
Street’ (then MI5 HQ). Aghast at the potential for the Security Service interfering in a 
film about their accountability, Mangold told the DG that he would discuss this with 
Bolton and the team at Lime Grove, as this was the first he had heard of official interest 
in the production. This led to an outburst from Trethowan, who allegedly described 
Bolton as a ‘Marxist little shit’ and forbade Mangold from discussing the meeting with 
his colleagues.
75
 Mangold later noted that he was made to ‘stand to attention’ in the 
DG’s presence.
76
 This exchange escapes mention in Trethowan’s follow-up memo to 
Mangold, commiserating about his inability to ‘open one or two doors’ for the team. He 
also attempted to mollify his subordinate, noting that ‘I don’t normally get involved in 
such programme details, but when we are dealing with such very sensitive issues, 
involving an inevitable Whitehall concern, it’s obviously helpful.’
77
 Trethowan’s 
alleged admission about passing the script to MI5 is all the more remarkable in light of 
the media focus that would be placed on Panorama in early 1981. 
 
1981 brought new challenges for the government and its bid to reinforce the secret state. 
The Panorama affair rumbled on and further revelations were on the horizon. Crispin 
Aubrey – of ABC Trial fame – was due to publish Who’s Watching You?, examining 
the intelligence services and his treatment at their hands.
78
 Even more sensationally 
(although the government did not have an inkling about it until February), Chapman 
Pincher was preparing his book Their Trade Is Treachery, an alarming, Le Carré-esque, 
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sensationalized account of Soviet moles at the top of Britain’s secret services.
79
 The 
Panorama production was therefore emerging into a world of revelations. 
 On 13 January, Trethowan viewed a rough cut of the 100-minute film at a 
screening in Soho. Also present at the screening were Bolton, Mangold, Penycate, and 
certain individuals unknown to the Panorama team.
80
 While, Trethowan claimed, there 
was a perfectly decent programme on accountability, when it turned to operational 
matters the team had ‘predictably done so in a manner which is naïve and wholly 
lacking in authority. Some of the witnesses are highly dubious and the programme as it 
stands would undermine the prestige of “Panorama” and the BBC.’ Trethowan 
suggested cuts to trim the episode down to the usual 50 minute Panorama slot.
81
 These 
cuts involved Panorama’s displaying of the intelligence service’s structure, which 
Trethowan claimed was inaccurate, but refused to say how or why.
82
 The DG 
communicated this to the Managing Director of Television Alasdair Milne, the Director 
of News and Current Affairs Richard Francis, and then downwards to the team. Francis 
– having spent several years running BBC operations in Northern Ireland and being the 
Corporations’s man on the D-Notice Committee – was only too aware of official 
secrecy’s strictures. In an effort to retain as much material as possible, he suggested 
splitting the programme into two episodes: one on the services and one on issues of 
surveillance and privacy.
83
 
 The critical feature of these events was that the cuts were not Trethowan’s. The 
mysterious figures at the 13 January screening included none other than Bernard 
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Sheldon. While a careful veil of secrecy was maintained around this, it was Sheldon – 
on the secret services’ behalf – who outlined the cuts that Trethowan should 
recommend, with Armstrong commenting to Thatcher on 30 January that Sheldon had 
done a ‘very good job’. Concurrently, the Cabinet Secretary was anxious that Sheldon’s 
role in affairs not filter down to the Panorama team for fear of leaks.
84
  
 Despite Sheldon’s ‘very good job’ of censorship, the situation was exacerbated 
by leaks to the print media, creating exactly the ‘hoo ha’ that Armstrong had wanted to 
avoid. Furthermore, it provided what might have been (but for Thatcher and Armstrong 
was not) an instructive lesson for the government about the dangers of interfering with 
public debate on intelligence issues. Unknown individuals within the BBC leaked the 
story to the Guardian’s David Leigh – himself a prominent critic of official secrecy – 
sparking a minor witch hunt at Lime Grove.
85
 Led by the Guardian, the Daily Express, 
Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, Morning Star, Sunday Times, and The Times all carried 
stories about government and secret services censorship, ‘tendentious’ and ‘carping’ 
accounts that Trethowan was forced to rebut.
86
 In all cases, the DG categorically denied 
there had been any government interference in the programme and that he was merely 
carrying an editor-in-chief’s duties.
87
 Claims of official intrusion influenced calls for an 
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official inquiry into phone tapping. Conservative MP John Gorst switched to the 
opposition side and supported tapping controls after the Guardian’s reporting on 
alleged Panorama revelations about NSA bugging of Labour party phones.
88
 
 Thus began a period when Trethowan became a scapegoat for the Panorama 
affair. Indeed, Armstrong was relieved that the spotlight was firmly on the Director 
General.
89
 Thatcher’s pugnacious press secretary Bernard Ingham took the standard 
government line that the PM would not comment on intelligence and security issues.
90
 
Armstrong recommended that, should Thatcher be quizzed in an upcoming TV 
interview, she should say that ‘The BBC were told that, in view of the risks to national 
security inherent in such a programme, people in Government service would be 
instructed not to give interviews or cooperate with those making the programme. But 
the BBC has, under its charter, complete editorial freedom, and it was and is, entirely 
within the responsibility of the BBC to decide whether to show such a programme.’ The 
Cabinet Secretary emphasised that ‘we should not, for instance, wish to be drawn on the 
channels by which or the levels at which the Government communicated with the BBC 
on these matters.’
91
 
 Government silence contrasted with demands on Trethowan to justify his 
actions. The DG stated to the Board of Management and the News and Current Affairs 
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Department that after Gau’s ‘naïve’ letters he had let the team continue, feeling that 
accountability was a matter of public interest. Although admitting that the government 
had indicated that the programme ‘was not a good idea’, his objections and cuts were 
based on maintaining editorial standards.
92
 Supporting the programme – and indicating 
that there had been talk of a potential prosecution – Glenn del Medico (the 
Corporation’s forceful lawyer) argued that the risks of showing the film were 
‘absolutely minimal’ and that a prosecution under the official secrets act was highly 
unlikely.
93
 Trethowan hoped that no one had read too much into the reports of 
censorship coming out the Guardian.
94
  
 Unfortunately for the Director General, many people were reading a 
considerable amount into the reports of censorship. The National Union of Journalists 
(NUJ) and the Federation of Broadcasting Unions (FBU) expressed their anger and 
concern at the allegations of government and secret service censorship.
95
 A meeting 
with union officials was hastily convened in order to head off a further confrontation 
with the unions, which had been plaguing the BBC for some time. Trethowan argued 
that the furore about censorship was merely a ‘storm in a largish teacup’.
96
 In a 
subsequent press release intended to calm the situation, Trethowan again claimed that 
nobody had challenged the BBC’s independence and that accountability, at least, was a 
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matter of legitimate public interest.
97
 Threats of potential legal action arrived from the 
hard-right former deputy director of MI6 George Young, who had taken part in the 
programme. Young was worried not about censorship, but about ‘grave distortions’ of 
his views by the Panorama team.
98
 The Director General agreed that, from what he had 
seen, some of the production was not very well balanced, but he was personally 
involved in making sure it took a fair approach.
99
 Finally, a group of agitated MPs (all 
NUJ members) also took the DG to task, with their leader Philip Whitehead (a former 
BBC producer) growing even more frustrated when the response arrived from a mere 
subordinate.
100
 Yet again, Trethowan had to mollify the aggrieved party.
101
 
 Censorship furore notwithstanding, the programme trundled towards 
transmission. Francis’ suggestion of splitting the production had been taken up, the film 
divided into a programme on the services (for transmission on 23 February) and a 
programme on privacy and surveillance (for transmission on 2 March).
102
 According to 
Francis, the programmes went to great lengths not to reveal critical intelligence sites or 
the names of serving officers.
103
 His deputy Alan Protheroe contended that the films 
raised ‘important principles which should very properly be the subject of a Panorama 
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programme.’
104
 Despite this, senior management were still on edge. Gau had to reassure 
Milne that two programmes in seven days would not be too hard for the public to take. 
Delaying screening would ‘provide a field day for the conspiracy theorists that abound 
in this area’ and that ‘cries of censorship would once again echo down the corridors of 
Fleet Street.’ Moreover, the phone tapping issue was highly topical, with Lord 
Diplock’s report on the matter due for release.
105
 Trethowan suspected that once the 
films were screened, those who cried ‘censorship!’ would wonder what all the fuss had 
been about.
106
 
Yet, there were still doubts about the two films. Trethowan asked Protheroe if 
there was the opportunity to tack a studio discussion onto the privacy programme? 
When the combative Protheroe said no, Trethowan expressed unhappiness about the 
way things had turned out, feeling that Lime Grove had ‘conned’ him. His unhappiness 
stemmed from a perceived lack of attention to Sheldon’s suggested cuts and the privacy 
production’s in-depth nature.
107
 Protheroe had good reason to resist Trethowan’s 
entreaties. Three days before, the D Notice Committee had instructed him to make 
further (albeit relatively minor) cuts to the programmes. Committee Secretary William 
Ash had received the scripts a few days earlier and felt that certain elements 
contravened D Notices and, despite the cuts, it was made clear that none of his 
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comments should be construed as giving permission for transmission.
108
 The cuts would 
have been more extensive, but as Armstrong pointed out to Thatcher, much of the 
material was already in the public domain. ‘In short,’ he noted ‘Sir Ian Trethowan has 
not managed to clean the programme up to the extent we might have hoped.’
109
 
Thatcher did not regard the programme’s transmission as a happy prospect but – short 
of deploying the veto – there was nothing more that could be done.
110
 
On 23 February the film on the secret services was transmitted, followed one 
week later by the privacy segment. The former was broad in scope, covering the KGB’s 
activities in the UK, the role of British mole in the Kremlin Oleg Penkovsky, lurid 
accusations by Conservative MP Jonathan Aitken about 1950s SIS plans to assassinate 
Egypt’s Gamel Abdel Nasser, the US-UK intelligence relationship, and the US IOA.
111
 
Accountability – the original issue behind the entire affair – was relegated to being one 
theme amongst many. Former Labour Foreign Secretary David Owen suggested on 
camera that parliamentary oversight of intelligence functions would be advantageous.
112
 
The privacy programme addressed issues of data protection, surveillance, and phone 
tapping. The film also highlighted the case of Jan Martin, a wholly innocent industrial 
film-maker who – because of an improbable series of events involving the Red Army 
Faction, Dutch police, MI5, Special Branch, the Taylor Woodrow building company, 
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and a database of security risks linked to British National Insurance numbers – had 
almost lost her livelihood.
113
 
After all the governmental anxiety, talk of censorship, Trethowan’s hand-
wringing, and imposed cuts, the programmes received little comment. Other stories – 
Prince Charles and Diana Spencer’s engagement on 24 February, an attempted coup in 
Spain, Thatcher’s visit to the United States to meet Reagan – dominated the headlines, 
with only a limited number of stories covering the programmes.
114
 Within the BBC, the 
reaction was muted. Gau thought the first programme ‘nice’ and ‘discrete’, while 
BBC1’s controller thought it ‘unsurprising’.
115
 More widely, some news and current 
affairs staff wondered what all the fuss had been about.
116
 Noting that the programme 
on privacy was easily the better of the two, Trethowan and Milne were relieved at the 
quiet passage of programmes that had ‘excited much controversy in advance.’
117
 
Mangold unintentionally agreed with Duncan Campbell when he noted that the 
brouhaha stemmed from the broadcaster moving into areas previously the print media’s 
province.
118
 
 Within government, the reaction was also muted. Anthony Acland was visited 
by a furious Lord Robert Hankey, formerly a senior British diplomat. Hankey felt that 
the first programme was very damaging and ‘symptomatic of the campaign to destroy 
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the effectiveness of our intelligence services’. He regarded the government as feeble on 
these matters and planned to take the matter up with Trethowan.
119
 Questions were also 
raised in the House, although Thatcher was given the usual advice to simply say nothing 
about the secret services.
120
 After all that had happened since Gau’s 27 May letters, the 
anger within government, the demonization of Trethowan, the media and union fury, 
and the exasperation generated at Lime Grove, the programmes sank with little trace. 
Three weeks later, Parliament would enter into vigorous debate, not about the 
accountability of Britain’s contemporary secret services, but regarding the accusations 
of decades-old betrayal that emerged from Chapman Pincher’s Their Trade is 
Treachery.
121
 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the programme’s relatively minor media impact and the overblown nature of 
government concerns, the furore is informative on several levels, and helps us to 
understand the development of tactics and beliefs that would come to be part of the 
Thatcher government’s approach to the media and secret intelligence issues in a 
resurgent Cold War. These tactics and beliefs would reach their apotheosis in the 
Spycatcher affairs four years later. The belief that public discussion about – and 
increased accountability of – secret service activities would automatically damage the 
morale and effectiveness of clandestine agencies was central to official objections. 
Again, this was founded in the idea of the Cold War as actual war. The affair illustrates 
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the power of ideas and dogmatic approaches. Thatcher never wavered from her 
conviction that the BBC was part of a left-wing, anti-British plot to discredit the 
security and intelligence services and damage Britain’s national security. That ‘national 
security’ was all the more important during a time when the Cold War resurged and 
‘The Troubles’ were an imminent threat. The BBC’s unwillingness to self-censor in the 
name of the national interest only served to reinforce the belief that the broadcaster was 
subversive, dangerous, and anti-British. 
On the other side, the Panorama team never wavered from their belief in what 
they were doing. The Thatcher government came up against a press seeking greater 
openness and accountability in public life. The Profumo affair, Watergate, revelations 
about the CIA, the availability of open source information, all of these influenced the 
climate into which the programme appeared. The very thing that Thatcher took issue 
with – the BBC’s reach and cachet, and the corporations mandate to inform – was the 
very reason why Mangold and his colleagues pursued the matter so doggedly. 
In their unwillingness to deploy the nuclear option of the veto, the government 
realised that their power to influence the media had limits. As the furore over censorship 
illustrates, openly suppressing inquiry – or attempting to do so – could have more 
dramatic consequences than the inquiries themselves. Regardless, such was their desire 
to prevent discussion on secret intelligence issues that they took great risks in their 
attempts to have the Panorama programmes suppressed. And, although despising Ian 
Trethowan’s ‘weakness’, it was actually his strength that prevented the affair from 
exposing official interference in the editorial affairs of Britain’s public broadcaster. 
Despite this, the tension between impartiality, responsibility, and national security 
during a period of resurgent Cold War was there for all to see. It also illustrated the 
problems that arose when the BBC stepped into sensitive areas that had previously been 
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the domain of print journalists. This was one area where Campbell and Mangold could 
agree: the rules for television were stricter than those for print. 
The Panorama affair was an early challenge to the Thatcher government’s views 
on secrecy. It demonstrated to them that suppressing information was possible, but the 
programmes’ muted passing left the most important official lesson unlearned, despite 
the realization that the veto was untenable. This lesson was that overzealous attempts at 
censorship were potentially far more damaging and dangerous that almost any 
information that was was made public. Spycatcher brought together the same volatile 
mixture of officialdom, the secret services and the media. Yet when Peter Wright’s 
memoir became an issue for Thatcher and Armstrong, there was no Ian Trethowan to 
act as a firewall between the government and a voracious press. 
MI5 came into official existence in 1989, followed in 1994 by MI6 and GCHQ. 
There is a good argument that in order to function effectively, secret services must have 
an appropriate level of secrecy. An equally valid argument demands that in democratic 
societies, clandestine agencies must be subject to appropriate oversight by Parliament, a 
free press and the public. The debate continues today over Edward Snowden’s status, 
communications surveillance, and the workings of intelligence services. It is a debate 
that we must have, and one that should be informed by an understanding of the ways in 
which the state, the intelligence services, and media have collided in our distant and 
recent past. 
